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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [KTFN](#) [UN](#) [AF](#) [RS](#)
SUBJECT: RUSSIANS AGAINST DELISTING MONIB

REF: STATE 70950

Classified By: Minister Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine.
Reasons: 1.4(B/D).

¶1. (C) On May 12 poloff delivered reftel demarche to MFA Afghanistan Section Chief Yuriy Khokhlov, and followed up on the issue with him in a May 15 discussion. On May 17 econoff double-tracked the demarche with Aleksandr Ubilava and Nikolay Ostrokhov from the MFA New Threats and Challenges Department. Khokhlov termed Monib a "bad guy" who had been involved in military training camps in Chechnya and Kazakhstan, according to GOR intelligence. While Monib was not known to have been guilty of "war crimes," Khokhlov insisted that Karzai's characterization of Monib as rehabilitated was not accurate. Khokhlov provided us a written response suggesting there was insufficient evidence to delist Monib and asking the USG to provide more detailed arguments in support of that action. That response has been faxed to EUR/RUS. An informal Embassy translation follows in paragraph 3.

¶2. (C) New Threats and Challenge's Ubilava acknowledged Monib's case deserved particular attention, but also said the GOR needed more detailed evidence that: a) Monib had truly renounced all ties to terrorism and the Taliban in Afghanistan; b) he was cooperating actively with the GOA and international community on counterterrorism; and c) he had not been involved in serious terrorist activity while a supporter of the Taliban. (According to Ubilava, the GOR had used a similar integrity test in granting amnesty to certain Chechens and regarded that standard as reasonable to apply here.) Ubilava added that the MFA had shared the U.S. delisting request with the Federal Security Service (FSB), and the GOR could provide additional background on Monib through separate channels.

¶3. (U) An informal Embassy translation of the Russian nonpaper follows below:

Begin Text:

Thank you for the appeal of the U.S. side with respect to removing mulavi Abdul Hakim Monib from the UNSC 1267 Committee's sanction list that you sent to us by fax.

I would like to note that the arguments set out in this appeal certainly deserve the closest attention and clearly indicate how much the United States is interested in a peaceful, democratic, and prosperous Afghanistan and in the earliest possible stabilization of this long-suffering country.

At the same time, as we have repeatedly told our colleagues, the arguments in favor of A.H. Monib's delisting presented to the 1267 Committee by the Afghan side are not sufficiently substantive or concrete. We believe that A.H. Monib's oath

of allegiance to the Government of Afghanistan, reports about his participation in the Loya Jirga, as well as reference to the fact that A.H. Monib has gone through a national reconciliation program and provided information that helped to capture undisclosed terrorists are absolutely insufficient for us to take a decision to remove him from the sanctions list. We are very interested in detailed information about A.H. Monib's functional responsibilities as deputy minister for borders and tribes for the Taliban regime, his participation or non-participation in the war crimes of that terrorist organization, and his political activities since December 2001, including his role in the split of the Taliban Movement and his contacts with present high-ranking Taliban functionaries. In addition, we need substantially more concrete details, possibly through special services channels, about the value of the information provided by A.H. Monib for the capture of terrorists and the prevention of terrorist attacks.

Unfortunately, the information available to us about A.H. Monib does not allow us to draw an unambiguous conclusion in favor of his delisting. This relates primarily to his work in the Taliban Administration, his involvement in attracting new recruits to the Taliban Movement, and his involvement in the organization of training camps for fighters, including foreign fighters, in the Afghan-Pakistani border area.

In this connection we would appreciate if the U.S. side would provide more detailed argumentation in favor of A.H. Monib's delisting. The above undoubtedly applies equally to any future appeals with respect to former and active members of terrorist groups in Afghanistan. End Text.

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